Abstract-This paper develops a novel methodology to study robust stability properties of Nash equilibrium points in dynamic games. Small-gain techniques in modern mathematical control theory are used for the first time to derive conditions guaranteeing uniqueness and global asymptotic stability of Nash equilibrium point for economic models described by functional difference equations.
I. INTRODUCTION
YNAMIC game-theoretical models have inherent uncertainty in many aspects. The uncertainty is related strongly to a number of open questions which cannot be answered a priori:
1. Should the models be formulated in continuous time or discrete time?
The answer to the above question is crucial: models in discrete time will be described by difference equations (see [1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 11, 21, 33] ) while models in continuous time are generally described by differential equations (with or without delays; see [4, 31] ). The answer to the above question has significant consequences: the perception of time for each player in a dynamic gametheoretical model affects her behavior.
2. What are the expectation rules that a player has for the other players? Again the answer to the above question is crucial: the behavior of a player will heavily rely on the expectations for the actions of the rest players. There is a large economic literature on the effect of expectation rules (e.g., naïve, backward-looking, rational expectations, see [3, 5, 10, 11] and references therein). Moreover, if expectation rules are using delay terms then the consequences on stability can be important (see [4, 20] ).
What are the values of the various constants involved in a dynamic game-theoretical model?
In many dynamic games, the rate of change of the action of one player is assumed to be proportional to either the deviation of the action from the best reply (see for example [6, 11] ) or the gradient of the payoff function Therefore, the answers to important questions such as the existence of a Nash equilibrium point, the uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium point and its stability properties are usually related to the specific assumptions made in order to cope with the uncertainty. Consequently, the following question arises: "Can we extract robust information from an uncertain nonlinear economic model, which will hold no matter what the uncertainty is?"
The present work answers it affirmatively. In some cases, we can even show the existence of a Nash equilibrium point, its uniqueness and its global asymptotic stability properties for all possible uncertainties. In order to be able to do this we propose the following methodology:
• First, we formulate our models in continuous time by means of Functional Difference Equations (see [9, [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] 32] ). By doing so we convert a finite-dimensional problem to an infinite-dimensional problem, which seems to be a clear disadvantage at first sight. However, in this way we can obtain all features of continuous time and discrete time models. Indeed, we will show that many models appeared in the literature can be considered as special cases of our proposed model.
• Second, we do not assume a specific expectation rule: instead, we will only assume that the expectation is consistent with the history of the game (consistent backward looking expectation; see Definition 2.1 below).
• In order to be able to extract important information from the uncertain model we use advanced stability methods. Indeed, by applying small-gain analysis (see [17, 18, 19] ), we can guarantee that the Nash equilibrium point is unique and globally asymptotically stable (see Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 4.2 below).
To our knowledge, this is the first time that such results are presented for dynamical game-theoretical nonlinear models. The only other work, which we have found and can address such questions, is [21] : our results generalize the results in [21] . Moreover, the results of [21] are applied in a discrete-time framework and cannot be used for the analysis of models in continuous time. As a byproduct of our work, we will also give conditions for uniqueness of a fixed point (see Corollary 3.2 and Corollary 3.3 below), which can be used in conjunction with classical fixed-point theorems and are different from other uniqueness conditions in the literature (see [8] ).
It should be noticed that the stability/uniqueness conditions obtained by the proposed methodology will be more demanding conditions than the ones which can be obtained from the study of a specific model (with specific expectation rules, specific values for the constants involved in the model and with a specific perception of time). However, this is expected since the stability/uniqueness conditions obtained by the proposed methodology are sufficient conditions for global asymptotic stability for an uncertain model, which contains many other models as special cases. To this end stability analysis by means of nonlinear small-gain theorems is utilized. Small-Gain results have been used frequently in stability studies (see [7, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19] ) and are based on variations of the Input-to-State Stability property introduced by E. D. Sontag in [26] and the Input-to-Output Stability property (see [14, 16, 27, 28] ).
The structure of the paper is as follows: in Section 2, we apply the above described methodology to the general case of dynamic strategic games: uncertain models described by Functional Difference Equations are produced based only on the data used for static analysis. In Section 3, the main results of the present work are stated. Our concluding remarks are given in Section 4. Due to space limitations all proofs are omitted and are available upon request. 
Notations
as usually in systems with delays (see [9] ). * For a vector
we will use the notation (see [30] 
q − is the vector of order 1 − n after deleting the i-th component
II. UNCERTAIN MODELS FOR DYNAMIC GAMES
Consider a strategic game with n players and
) being the action space for each one of the players. We assume that the best reply mapping for each one of the players is a function
, satisfying the following inequalities:
is the payoff function of the i-th player.
We assume the existence of a Nash equilibrium S q ∈ * for the game, where
is the outcome space for the game, i.e., there exists
The existence of a Nash equilibrium can be guaranteed by Brouwer's fixed point theorem when all action spaces
) are compact and convex and when all the best reply mappings
are continuous mappings.
Next we assume that
) are closed convex sets and that the dynamics of the game are described in continuous time as follows:
• every player forms an expectation for the behavior of all other players at each time 0 ≥ t : the expectation of the i-th player for the production level of the j-th player at time 0 ≥ t will be denoted by
• every player determines her action as a convex combination of a past action and the best reply response based on the expectations for the behavior of other players at each time 0 ≥ t , i.e., for n i ,...,
where
• all expectation rules
Consistent Backward-looking expectations with respect to the Nash equilibrium point S q ∈ * , i.e., there exist constants T r ≤ < 0 such that the following inequality holds for all 0
We notice the following fact for consistent backwardlooking expectations: 
The above Fact shows that if all action spaces
) such that the evolution of the game is described by (3) and (5 
unknown. Therefore, the dynamical system (3), (5) is an uncertain dynamical system described by Functional Difference Equations (FDEs) (see [9, [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] 32] ). In order to study the behavior of the solutions of (3), (5) we define the deviation variables * − =
) and we obtain from (3) and (5): Finally, we assume that there exist functions
) such that the following inequalities hold for all S q ∈ :
Using again the fact that
, where n U ℜ ⊆ is a closed convex set and inequalities (7), we obtain from (6) for all 0 ≥ t and Θ > μ :
Remarks about system (6):
a) The reader should notice that system (6) is an infinitedimensional dynamical system with state space X being the normed linear space of bounded functions
where and functions ] , 0 [ :
) then one can in principle determine from (6) the solution
. Then we can determine from (6) the solution
. Continuing this way, we can determine from (6) the solution
, where k is a positive integer. The state of system (6) will be denoted by
as usually in systems with delays (see [9] ) and the components of the state by } : 
Without loss of generality we may assume that
Working in this way and using induction we may establish that for every positive integer 0
where [ ] r t / denotes the integer part of r t / .
b) The reader should also notice that X ∈ 0 is an equilibrium point for system (6) . Indeed, for any functions 
c) All discrete-time models of the form: 
exp , (14) where
), are immersed in the uncertain model (3), (5) and its equivalent expression (6) in the sense that for every model of the form (13), (14) 
that the solution of (3), (5) coincides with the solution obtained by the discrete-time model (13), (14) .
and if all expectation
) are Consistent Backwardlooking expectations with respect to the Nash equilibrium
) are continuous, then all continuous-time models of the form: 
) are continuous, we can conclude that for all r t ≥ and n i ,...,
The reader may verify that for Consistent Backward-looking expectations with respect to the Nash equilibrium point S q ∈ * , the above model can be described by the uncertain model (3) with
,..., 1
e) The reader should notice that no continuity assumption is made for the best reply mappings of the players
. Moreover, we have not assumed that the action spaces
) are compact sets: we simply require that the action spaces are closed, convex sets. However, we have assumed the existence of a Nash equilibrium point S q ∈ * and the existence of functions
) satisfying (7).
III. ROBUST STABILITY OF NASH EQUILIBRIUM FOR UNCERTAIN DYNAMIC GAMES
The crucial question that can be posed is the question of robust asymptotic stability of the Nash equilibrium S q ∈ * for system (3), (5) or equivalently the question of robust asymptotic stability X ∈ 0 for system (6) . The following theorem is the main result of this section and shows that robust global stability can be determined by the functions
Theorem 3.1:
is Robustly Globally Asymptotically Stable for system (6) In other words, if conditions (16) hold then the Nash equilibrium point S q ∈ * is robustly Globally Asymptotically Stable with respect to all possible Consistent Backward-looking expectation rules with respect to the Nash
It should be emphasized that the parameters 0 > ≥ r T which are involved in the expressions of the Consistent Backward-looking expectations, play no role in the smallgain conditions. Consequently, the small-gain conditions can help us to decide whether the Nash equilibrium point is robustly stable without any knowledge of the expectation rules. The small-gain conditions (16) demand knowledge of the Nash equilibrium point S q ∈ * and the best reply mappings
for which inequalities (7) hold. The proof of Theorem 3.1 relies on recent results on dynamical systems (see [19] ) and techniques developed for delayed systems (see [18, 19] ).
An interesting corollary is given next. 
is continuous) in order to guarantee uniqueness of the fixed point.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, advanced stability methods have been used in order to provide sufficient conditions, called cyclic small gain conditions, which guarantee robust global asymptotic stability of the Nash equilibrium in dynamic games. The obtained results are powerful because they can be applied to uncertain models for which the players form consistent expectations based on the history of the game. In addition, by formulating dynamic game-theoretical models by means of Functional Difference Equations, it is possible to obtain all features of continuous-time and discrete-time models.
Applications to the Cournot oligopoly game (see for instance [1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 11, 29, 31, 33] ) have been studied but are omitted due to space limitations. Moreover, it can be shown that the case of rational expectations can be accommodated by the uncertain models described by Functional Difference Equations, proposed in the present work.
Future research can address the economic meaning of small-gain conditions to other games used in economic research (e.g., the study of the stability properties of the Walrasian equilibrium of an abstract economy). A step towards this research direction is the fact that the results presented in this work can be directly extended to the case where the best reply mappings are set-valued maps instead of functions, i.e., 
The above set of inequalities directly implies that the Nash equilibrium point satisfies . With this modification, Theorem 3.1, Corollary 3.2 and Corollary 3.3 hold in this case as well. Future research can also address the issue of studying dynamic game-theoretical models by means of recent results in hybrid systems theory (see [24, 25] ) or the issue of stabilization of Nash equilibria for dynamic game-theoretical models by means of nonlinear feedback laws, using recently proposed methodologies (see for example [22, 23] ).
